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 On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military waged a siege against the Presidential Palace of La 
Moneda in the nation’s capital at Santiago. Their target was Salvador Allende, President of Chile and 
leader of the Unidad Popular, a leftist political coalition. At the end of this military standoff, Allende was 
dead, several of his cabinet members were taken hostage, and the military was inserting itself into the 
political vacuum to rule the Chilean people in an ultra-right wing dictatorship. This act of insurrection by 
the Chilean military against its government was the result of a sequence of failed policies created from a 
political experiment hailed by Allende as the “Chilean way to socialism.” The novelty of the “Chilean 
way” experiment is that maintained the Marxist principle of redistribution of wealth but varied from 
Marxist methodology by arguing that it could be achieved without a violent revolution of the proletariat. 
The implications of this theory threatened the Cold War balance of power in the western hemisphere 
and prompted the both the United States and the Chilean political right to take action against its 
possible success.   
Ever since the beginning of Allende’s political career, in 1933, these organizations have both 
covertly and conspicuously tried to impede Allende’s ascension to power in Chile. While political 
candidates such as Jorge Alessandri and Eduardo Frei ran against Allende and succeeded in winning the 
presidency in the elections of 1958 and 1964, respectively; in both elections the United States 
government covertly undermined the Allende’s attempts. It was only in 1970, during Allende’s fourth 
run for president, did he finally succeed in winning by plurality, not a majority,1 and was inaugurated as 
President of Chile.  
As part of Allende’s “Chilean way,” he attempted to make Chile self-sufficient and a developed 
nation by expropriating industries from foreign capitalists, raising wages, bettering the healthcare 
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system for his citizens, and implementing cutting edge technological apparatuses for his country. The 
ultimate tragedy for Allende was after obtaining the position necessary for him to implement his theory; 
he died in a coup that broke out in opposition to his theory. The death of Allende marked the bloody 
end of this leftist experiment and the beginning of an era of repression and terror. While the United 
States can be held responsible for some of these elements, credit cannot be solely attributed to the 
Nixon administration for the failure of the “Chilean way.” The dead end of the Chilean way can be 
attributed to several individuals, foreign and domestic, military and civilian, and rich and poor. In this 
paper, I will examine Allende’s attempts to bring socialism to Chile starting with his first candidacy for 
president in 1952 in order to demonstrate that Allende’s peaceful road to socialism was doomed to fail 
due to an overwhelming amount of opposition from both the United States and members of Chilean 
society.   
In order to examine Allende’s political aspirations, it is first necessary to examine the life of 
Allende himself. Salvador Allende Gossens was born June 28, 1906 to a wealthy family in Valparaiso, 
Chile.2 The financial status of his family and its lavish lifestyle later posed a contradiction to Allende’s 
leftist views toward capitalism. This sentiment is buttressed by an experience U.S. defense attaché to 
Santiago, Col. Paul Wimert, had with Allende in which he recalls the following:  
This beautiful yacht…came gliding across the water to hook up to the wharf, and there was this 
gentleman un a white hat and a white cravat with a blue admiral’s coat…He looked [like] one of 
those old wealthy people--- the Vanderbilts of America—I couldn’t believe he was Allende…He 
was beautifully groomed, and of course his sailing ship was one of the nicest ones there. It didn’t 
sit right that he was supposed to be a communist or a socialist.3 
 
This image of a politician from Chile’s bourgeoisie earned Allende the reputation of being a 
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“champagne socialist”4 following the European tradition and championing the ideas of change through 
democratic reform. He starkly contradicted with the “barbudo” communist like Fidel Castro or Che 
Guevara  who, like Allende, hailed from the upper classes of their societies, but believed that guerilla 
warfare was the best way facilitate social change. In 1933, while still in medical school, Allende founded 
the Chilean Socialist Party, which countered the already existing Chilean Communist Party. 5 In an 
interview with Regis Debray, Allende explains he formed the Socialist Party as an alternative to the 
Communist Party due to the fact that he believed the Communist Party was “a closed inward looking 
party.” He, along with the other founders of the Socialist Party, “analyzed the situation in Chile and 
…believed that there was a place for a Party which while holding similar views in terms of philosophy 
and doctrine ---a Marxist approach to the interpretation of history---would be a Party free of ties of an 
international nature.”6   Allende did maintain however that although the Chilean Socialist Party was 
separated from the Chilean Communist Party, it still championed the Marxist ideal of the international 
plight of the proletariat.  
 Four years after forming the Socialist Party, Allende was elected as a Federal Deputy in the non-
Marxist Popular Front government and later served briefly as Minister of Health.7  In 1952, Allende 
proposed legislation that provided public healthcare for low income people. This legislation led to the 
creation of the National Health Service, or Servicio Nacional de Salud or SNS.8 In the same year he made 
his first attempt to run for President of Chile as a Socialist and would receive 5.5 percent of the vote.9 In 
1958, shortly before his second run for president, Allende was approached by a KGB agent codenamed 
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LEADER. Whose appraisal of Allende was that “his willingness to co-operate on a confidential basis and 
provide any necessary assistance” meant he considered himself “a friend of the Soviet Union” and 
“willingly shared political information.”10  
While Allende’s connection with the KGB have attracted him some attention as a Soviet 
sympathizer, his campaign platform in the 1958 Presidential election made him the biggest communist 
threat to the western hemisphere. For the next three campaigns, Allende would run under the principles 
of “redistribut[ing] income and reshap[ing] the Chilean economy, beginning with the nationalization of 
major industries, especially the copper companies; greatly expand[ing] agrarian reform” and concluding 
with “expanding relations with socialist and communist communities.”11  
The gravity of Allende’s threat to U.S. Cold War strategy can best be described by Assistant 
Secretary for the Bureau of Inner-American Affairs, Roy Rubottom, who pointed out during the 1958 
Presidential Election, “If Allende were to win we could be faced with a pro-Soviet, anti-U.S. 
administration in one of the most important countries in the hemisphere.”12 As a result of this looming 
threat of Chile being the first Marxist state in the West,13 the U.S. government authorized the CIA to 
take action against Allende in order to prevent him from being elected to the office of president. Later a 
congressional investigation would reveal that the CIA spent $8 million dollars in affecting the outcomes 
of the 1958, 1964, and 1970 elections.14 The CIA, ordinarily conducts several types of operations in 
foreign countries which fit under the categories of clandestine collection of positive foreign intelligence: 
counterintelligence (or liaison with local services); and covert action. 
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Under the category of “covert action,” the CIA would construct its strategy against Allende as a 
candidate and later as a president. The primary operation that the CIA conducted against Allende was 
the creation and dissemination of propaganda. This proved to be a cost effective strategy for the CIA 
because it was relatively cheap to produce, could be disseminated through media outlets, and could be 
produced faster in times with a little rise in cost if it was needed in an extreme situation.15 The CIA also 
employed a style of propaganda known as “black” propaganda, which served the purpose of “falsely 
purporting the product of a particular individual or group.”16 The dissemination and exchange of 
blatantly false information has the purpose of misleading the targeted group. The efficacy of “black” 
propaganda can be problematic as evidenced by the fact that it was employed in the 1970 presidential 
election to sow discord between the Communist and Socialist Parties.17 This tactic would create new 
problems for governing when in this election Allende finally achieved the presidency.  
The second element of the CIA’s covert campaign against Allende’s political aspirations was the 
subsidizing of Chilean media organizations that were friendly to those of the United States. An example 
of this was the CIA bankrolling the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio in 1970 to oppose Allende whose 
right leaning politics served as a weapon by which the CIA could covertly combat Allende.18 To achieve 
this,  $4.3 million would be used in this process over the years to combat him.19 This money proved to 
be even more powerful than the initial figure implies due to the strength of the American dollar in the 
Chilean economy. This is evidenced by a statement made by an anonymous CIA operative in Chile who 
said, “Money went a long way there. A couple of copy machines, etc. and a few thousand dollars did 
things.”20 
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A third element that the CIA used involved the infiltration of various organizations in Chile such 
as the Chilean military and its political parties. From 1964-1968, the CIA successfully recruited 
collaborators both Frei’s administrative cabinet and the Socialist Party.21 This phenomenon only 
intensified as time progressed. A critic of this process, Kyle Steenland, points out in his article entitled 
“The Coup in Chile” that by the time of the 1973 coup, the CIA had infiltrated all political parties in 
Chile.22 Steenland also points out that the CIA as well as the U.S. military took a leadership role in 
training Chile’s Black Berets, the equivalent of the United States Special Forces.23 This fact suggests that 
the CIA and the U.S. military had some involvement in the coup attempt that lead to the death of 
Allende in 1973.  
Finally, the last covert action the CIA took against Allende in his elections of 1958, 1964, and 
1970 was the funding of opposing parties such as the Christian Democratic Party and the National Party. 
This is documented by the fact that $4 million dollars by the CIA was funded to these parties during the 
time of Allende’s presidency. 24More would come to these parties, especially the Christian Democratic 
Party, during the time of Allende’s campaigns.   
With all of these covert elements in place, the U.S. government sought out to prevent the 
election of Allende starting for the first time in 1958. While the CIA succeeded in their efforts in 
preventing Allende from winning the election, the margin by which he lost was incredibly narrow. 
Allende finished second in the 1958 Presidential election losing to Alessandri who could not gain a 
majority in the election and was voted in by the Chilean Congress. According to the Church Report the 
few thousand votes which went to a leftist priest, had instead gone to Allende he would have achieved a 
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majority and would have won the election.25 This fact placed fears on the potential outcome of the 1964 
presidential election as U.S. Ambassador to Chile Walter Howe stated after the election, “we must 
recognize that the political pendulum has swung as far to the right in Chile as it is likely to go, and that 
the return swing is likely to be evidenced in the presidential election of 1964.”26 This fear would 
resonate in every presidential election in which Allende ran because of the implication that a Marxist 
candidate could rise to power via the democratic process.  
In 1959, however, Allende’s threat to the Cold War status quo was dramatically eclipsed by the 
rise of Fidel Castro and his Cuban Revolution. This dramatic event in modern Latin American history had 
a profound impact on Allende’s political career. Allende was one of the first politicians to visit Havana, 
Cuba after the successful march of the Castro brothers into the city. In a later 1973 interview with Regis 
Debray, Allende indicated that he was initially not impressed with the outcome of the Revolution: 
I was at my hotel and that afternoon there was a parade, which for me, was not merely 
surprising, but quite simply incredible. This parade was headed by 200 Miami policemen, and in 
an open car there was the Mayor of Miami and I think the Mayor of Havana. Next day, intending 
to take a plane to Chile, I met Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, whom I had known in Chile. He asked me 
what I was doing there, and I replied, ‘I came to see the Revolution, but since there is no such 
Revolution, I’m going. What kind of Revolution is this going to be, with the Miami police in 
attendance?’27   
Rodriguez was able to introduce Allende to the leaders of the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro 
and Ernesto “Che” Guevara. When introducing himself, Guevara was interrupted telling him, “Look, 
Allende, I know perfectly well who you are. I heard two of your speeches during the ’52 presidential 
campaign; one was very good, the other very bad. So we can talk in complete confidence, because I 
have a very clear opinion of who you are.”28Allende’s friendship with Guevara would mature over the 
years. In the same interview with Debray, Allende mentions having a signed copy of Guevara’s book The 
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Guerrilla War which reads, “To Salvador Allende, who is trying to obtain the same result by other means. 
Affectionately, Che.”29 Allende’s relationship with Guevara continued during the time of his Bolivian 
campaign.  In addition to being the founder of the Chilean Socialist Party, Allende also helped found the 
Latin American Solidarity Organization which played an integral part in getting Cuban guerrillas out of 
Bolivia after Guevara’s death.30  
Allende met Fidel Castro on the same day he met Guevara and was instantly impressed by his 
“immense intelligence” but he also had “fundamental and violent” differences of opinion with him.”31 
Castro criticized Allende’s Chilean Way to Socialism which was announced after he was elected 
president. In a speech which Castro gave to the Latin American Solidarity Organization, he stated that 
“Those who believe that they are going to win against the imperialists in elections are just naive, and 
those who believe that the day will come when they will take over through elections are even more 
naive ... That socialism can come to power without a struggle, that it can come to power peacefully 
through elections is a lie.”32  
However, Castro decided to assist Allende in his endeavors by helping him construct a security 
agency consisting of his own Cuban intelligence officers who worked “both under diplomatic cover, and 
as ‘illegals.’33” Castro also provided Allende with assistance in reforming the healthcare system by 
sending advisors from his Ministry of Health to Chile during the time of Allende’s Presidency.34 While 
Allende considered Castro to be a good friend and was in his debt considerably, from his acts of aid, the 
Church committee documents that Allende “refrained from excessive overtures” to him.35 As a gift to his 
“comrade in arms” Castro gave Allende an AK-47 assault rifle with the message “To Salvador, from your 
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comrade in arms, Fidel (A Salvador de su compañero de armas, Fidel)”36inscribed on it. Ironically, this is 
the same rifle by which Allende allegedly took his own life three years later. 
When the United States perceived the Cuban Revolution to be Marxist in nature, it began to 
combat its influence in Latin America. The United States started its new anti-communist campaign in the 
western hemisphere by attempting to isolate Cuba economically and diplomatically, encouraging other 
western countries to follow suit. As a result of this pressuring by the United States after the Cuban 
Revolution, Jorge Alessandri broke all diplomatic and economic ties between Cuba and Chile during his 
administration.37 This was a decision that Allende would reverse as one of his first acts as president. The 
United States also provided an economic incentive for countries to isolate Cuba with its Alliance for 
Progress campaign. The purpose of this campaign was, as Kennedy explained to,  
…offer a special pledge --- to concert our good words into good deeds--- in a new alliance for 
progress--- to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this 
peaceful revolution of hope cannot become prey to hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know 
that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas.38  
In accordance with this plan, the United States sent $17 billion in foreign aid to Latin American 
countries.39 The purpose of this plan, much like its predecessor, the Marshal Plan, which rebuilt Europe 
after World War II was to build the modern infrastructures of developing countries with the ulterior 
motive of making capitalism appealing to its citizens. This sentiment is well articulated by Washington 
lawyer and Assistant Secretary of State under the Nixon administration, William D. Rogers, who stated 
that the Alliance for Progress plan was “admittedly (designed) to counter the lure coming out of 
                                                          
36
 Oscar Soto, El Ultimo Dia de Salvador Allende (Santiago, Chile, Aguilar Chilena de Ediciones, Ltd. 1998), 66 
37
 Soto, 43 
38
 Gustafson, 24-25 
39
 Gustafson, 26 
Garcia 10 
 
Havana.”40Another way the United States “countered the lure” was influencing the outcome of elections 
in Latin America, especially of candidates that had Marxist sympathies, such as Allende.  
With Allende deciding to run for president again in 1964, the United States was particularly 
invested in the outcome of the Chilean election, both politically and economically.  In October 1963, the 
first National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of Chile brought up the possibility that “the 1964 presidential 
election might bring to power a government under strong Communist influence, if not control.”41 This 
statement has credence for two reasons. The first reason is 1964 was the year Chile and the Soviet 
Union re-established diplomatic relations.42 The second reason is the fact that Allende was running this 
time under a political coalition known as the Popular Action Front (FRAP), which consisted widely of 
leftist politicians. This would serve as the predecessor for the Popular Unity coalition under which 
Allende would run in the 1970 election. In this election, Allende fully came into the scope of the U.S. 
government as evidenced in a profile on Allende written in the same NIE which reads that Allende was: 
a chameleonic person.. Is vain, quick tempered, easily offended, socially as well as politically 
ambitious... Sensitive to charges (that) he would be dominated by Communists or that he would 
institute anti-democratic measures. Nevertheless were he to achieve power we think he could 
be led by events into being harsh and ruthless with his opponents but more likely use exile than 
prison or pardon. It is probably that he thinks in terms of a Marxist regime similar to Castro's 
Cuba in its free-wheeling, relatively independent, but bit more sophisticated, cultured, without 
the notional excesses of a "tropical" country such as Cuba.43 
 Such a notion was unacceptable to the Kennedy administration and the Johnson administration 
after Kennedy’s assassination had specifically ordered that a right wing candidate win the election. 
Therefore, the CIA began to covertly support the Christian Democratic candidate Eduardo Frei.44 The 
CIA’s choice of the Christian Democratic Party was designed to attract the “soft-socialist/pro-clerical” 
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vote away from Allende’s FRAP, thereby sabotaging his potential to win the election.45 This decision by 
the CIA was very prudent due to the fact that the Soviet Union, taking advantage of its new relations 
with Chile, sought to create Catholic trade unions in order to “strengthen the clerical position in the 
worker movement.”46 Therefore, strengthening Frei’s campaign had the potential to pull Chileans out of 
the Soviet orbit and back into proper alignment with the United States.  
In addition to giving Frei the some necessary money and logistical support to win the election, 
the CIA also covertly built up the appeal of the Christian Democratic Party to members of Chile’s peasant 
and slum dwelling class. The purpose of this was to “train and organize ‘anti-communists’ in these 
sectors”47 which typically tend to embrace Marxist doctrine. The CIA continued to do this until it was 
exposed in a congressional probe on the CIA’s use of funds and was cut off in 1967. However, it should 
be noted that the CIA maintained its infiltrated status in Frei’s cabinet.  
The CIA appropriated $2 million to the Frei presidential campaign. This amount of money served 
to be a considerable amount of money, even by American campaign standards. An additional $500,000 
was earmarked for the Frei campaign because “Frei had miscalculated his finances.” The CIA simply 
attributed this misuse of funds to his party’s “inexperience in organizing a campaign of this 
magnitude.”48As debates ensued as to whether the addition $500,000 should be sent to the Frei 
campaign, NSC staffer Peter Jessup made the case that the United States “can’t afford to lose this one, 
so I don’t think there should be any economic shaving in this instance. We assume the Commies are 
pouring in dough; we have no proofs. They assume we are pouring in dough; they have no proofs. Let’s 
pour it on and in.”49 
                                                          
45
 Gustafson, 35 
46
 Hamburg, 608 
47
 The Church Committee, 35 
48
 Gustafson, 45 
49
 Gustafson, 46 
Garcia 12 
 
In addition to funding the Frei election campaign, the CIA also began disseminating propaganda 
for the purposes of frightening the Chilean people of a communist dictatorship that could potentially 
rise in their country. These propaganda campaigns included the funding of media organizations against 
the leftist policies of Allende and the FRAP as well as posters “depicting Soviet tanks and Cuban firing 
squads” attacking Chilean civilians.50 During this election, a firm opposition organization was built that 
would later be used when Allende finally won the election in 1970. This opposition consisted of the 
military as well as other right wing organizations. On June 2, 1964, an anti-leftist organization known as 
the “Legion of Liberty” took form consisting of a “Radical Party candidate for election, several other 
Chileans and an ex-politician from another Latin American country.” Less than two months later on July 
20, a Chilean Air Force general threatened the Chilean people with the possibility of a coup if Allende 
won the election.51  
The policies of the Legion of Liberty and the Chilean military were not only restricted to 
attacking leftist politicians. Moderate and conservative politicians were targeted as well. The Legion of 
Liberty also threatened an armed rebellion against the government if Frei ever pursued a coalition with 
the Communist Party. This is most likely in retaliation to a statement made by Allende during the 
campaign that his FRAP would be willing to form a coalition with Frei’s Christian Democratic Party in 
order to implement reform.52 The formation of this anti-communist group demonstrates an opposition 
to leftist ideas which stems from a Latin America itself and not the United States. This is an important 
precedent to notice because in the 1970 election and during the Allende administration, more anti-
leftist groups formed independently demonstrating that there was also an anti-Marxist sentiment native 
to Chile.   
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Frei would win the 1964 presidential election with 57 percent of the vote and began his 
“Revolution in Liberty” campaign.53As part of this campaign, Frei sought to expand the economy by 
“Chileanizing” the copper mines, 80 percent of which were owned by the American companies 
Anaconda and Kennecutt.54 The purpose of “Chileanization” was to have the Chilean government and 
the two aforementioned American companies work together to increase production and the quantity of 
local refining. In his article entitled “Chile: From Christian Democracy to Marxism?” Alan Angell outlines 
the failure of this plan by stating that “the high price paid by Chile for the major mine involved, the El 
Teniente mine of the Kennecott company, meant high returns for the Americans and low returns for 
Chile.”55 
Another act of reform that the Frei administration attempted was to raise the wages of people 
living in rural areas. Peter A. Goldberg in his article entitled “The Politics of the Allende Overthrow in 
Chile” outlines the logic Frei might have followed by which an act of reform like this had the potential to 
work. Goldberg states that government and white collar employees received a cost for living raise in 
1940 and blue-collar workers in 1956 and the economy flourished. However, when Frei attempted to 
use this for the rural working class, the economy suffered 30 percent inflation due to the fact that the 
Chilean economy did not have the supply to meet the demand of such a raise in wages.56  
Some successes of the Frei administration, however, include raising Chile’s exports from $676 
million to $1.139 billion and turning a Chile’s budget from a $4 million dollar deficit in 1964 to a $183 
million dollar surplus.57 It should be noted, however, that the rise in exports was mostly attributable to 
the copper industry as demonstrated by the fact that non-copper exports only rose from $193 million to 
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$231 million during his presidency.58This is an indicator that Chile, may have had what Castro referred to 
as, a “one dimensional economy.” Frei also expanded the electoral base of the Chilean populous to 
include youth voters, recognized trade unions in the economic process, and called for the organization 
of “Neighborhood Committees” which may coincide with the CIA’s attempts to attract the lower class to 
the Christian Democratic Party and away from the leftist Popular Action Front coalition.59 This is 
evidenced by Oscar Soto’s account of the Frei administration as being a “Revolution in liberty, against 
the left.” (Revolucion de Libertad, contra la izquierda).”60 
Due to Chile’s constitution that says a president may serve two terms but not consecutively, Frei 
could not seek re-election in the 1970 election cycle. Therefore Radmiro Tomic was chosen as the 
presidential candidate of the Christian Democratic Party, Alessandri, now eligible for a second term, 
sought election under the National Party, and Allende pursued the presidency for a fourth time with his 
coalition of leftists, the Popular Unity, and ran under the slogan, “the objective is total, scientific, 
Marxist socialism.”61 
The Popular Unity consisted primarily of a union between the Socialist Party, Radical Party and 
the Communist Party but also consisted of various extremist left wing organizations such as the 
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario or Revolutionary Leftist Movement, or MIR, and the 
Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo or the Organized Vanguard of the People, or VOP. It is very important 
to point out that this coalition represented views from all corners of the left wing from moderate to 
extreme. This ideological diversity caused major issues for Allende once he achieved power.   
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This was the fourth time Allende tried to obtain the presidency and the third time the United 
States government covertly attempted to sabotage his election by employing covert strategies. The 
1970 election also showed the potential for violence of the right and military against Allende. This is 
evidenced by a statement made by Ambassador James Gardner who said that “if an Allende victory 
appears certain, Frei should act on his own to have the armed forces intervene.”62  
The United States was desperate to have Allende lose the 1970 election and was confident that 
such an event would happen based on the 1969 NIE which stated that even though a Marxist coalition 
would have won the election, the Chilean people would be resistant to “dependence on Moscow or 
Havana”63 for material and political sustenance. While it was possible that Chile might cut off its ties 
with the United States, it would be equally opposed to the Soviet Union. The same NIE questions the 
efficacy of a Marxist coalition in power due to the fact that it must “appeal to at least partially to the 
opposing spectrum of the electorate in order to pass certain reforms.”64  This point would be 
demonstrated much to the frustration of Allende during his tenure as president.  
The NIE also states that an accelerated political movement “toward ‘a full embrace of 
communism’ would engender a counter-reaction by Argentina, Peru, and/or the United States in 
support of the Chilean military, if not a direct invasion.” 65 This point is well taken considering the local 
and international opposition of communism in the western hemisphere. However, this did not “exactly” 
happen, for reasons which will be discussed later. The NIE also prophetically states that if such 
momentum to communism was “try[ing] to move too far and too fast, the Chilean security forces would 
unseat it.”66 
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Therefore, using all of the strategies it had already employed in previous elections, the CIA 
under the instruction of President Nixon for the third time tried to prevent Allende from obtaining the 
office of president. This time, the United States failed. Allende succeeded in obtaining a plurality in the 
election, receiving 36.3 percent of the vote to Jorge Alessandri’s 34.9 percent of the National Party and 
Radmiro Tomic’s 27.8 percent for the Christian Democratic Party.67 Angell attributes Alessandri’s loss to 
his failure to use television as a medium for a political agenda. While Allende and Tomic had each made 
twenty-four appearances on television, Alessandri only appeared three times, and in each, he was 
perceived to be “looking old, ill at ease, and nervous.”68  
With Allende winning the popular vote but lacking a majority, the Nixon administration 
developed two innovative strategies to prevent Allende from being inaugurated. The first strategy, 
known as “Track I” involved negotiating with conservative and Christian Democratic members of Chilean 
Congress a piece of political maneuvering known as “the Frei gambit.” Under this strategy, those 
congress representatives opposed to Allende,would vote for Alessandri instead of Allende for the office 
of president. Upon being inaugurated, Alessandri would immediately resign, and prompting a special 
election by which Frei could legally be a candidate due to the fact that technically a president had served 
after his administration.69  
The attempt prevent Allende from being inaugurated failed when the Christian Democrats 
rejected the maneuver. Then the Nixon administration authorized “Track II,” a covert military action 
whereby Allende would be prevented from being inaugurated by a military coup. In implementing this 
plan, Nixon arranged a private meeting between himself, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, 
Attorney General John Mitchell, and CIA Director Richard Helms. The U.S. Ambassador to Chile was 
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intentionally not at this meeting in order to uphold the illusion that the U.S. had no involvement or prior 
knowledge to the coup.70 This is a tactic the U.S. government would use again in 1973. Under “Track II,” 
Nixon authorized the CIA to send “three submachine-guns…to three military officers who planned to use 
them in instigating an uprising in the Armed Forces.”71 This uprising would then capture General Rene 
Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, and a prime obstacle for instigating a coup. The 
military would then remove the existing government and seize control of the country. This was the 
theory. The actual practice of this plan is another topic entirely.  
Colonel Paul Wimert was the American officer chosen to coordinate the coup and described the 
evolution as “a Christmas party--- throwing [money] here, some there and some to some place else. 
There was no real… leadership in the Washington area.”72As a result, contact broke down with the 
Chilean military officers and the weapons were returned to the U.S. government. But the kidnapping 
attempt by the officers continued, even though the U.S. government was not supporting them. On 
October 22, 1970, the officers attempted to kidnap Schneider, who resisted, was shot, and shortly 
thereafter, died.73 General Carlos Prats, a firm supporter of the Chilean constitution, quickly took power 
and blocked the coup by remaining loyal to the government and its constitution. This armed attempt to 
block Allende’s inauguration had failed.  
Two days after the failed attempt of Track II, Allende was elected president of Chile receiving 
153 votes in his favor to 42 either against or abstaining.74 Finally, after four elections, three of which 
were influenced by the CIA, Allende became president of Chile. The failure of “Track II” forced the Nixon 
administration to re-evaluate its stance against Allende and it decided to take a “cool and correct” 
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stance to his administration.75 Instead of assisting in armed military conflict, Nixon decided, as 
articulated in National Security Decision memorandum 93, to attack the Allende administration 
economically by “cutting off all new bilateral and multilateral aid.”76 This decision would prove to inflict 
far more damage on Chile than the previous coup attempts.  
Upon getting elected president, Allende declared that in his victory address that “I won't be just 
another President: I will be the first President of the first really democratic, popular, national, and 
revolutionary government in the history of Chile”77 and that “along with me, the people are entering La 
Moneda.”78 From the office of the president, Allende could finally execute his peaceful transition from 
capitalism to socialism. In implementing his “Chilean way,” Allende sought to advance Chile from a 
developing nation to a developed nation employing all sorts of innovation and reform.  
In keeping with the precedent set by his predecessor, Frei, Allende sought to increase the rate at 
which land was expropriated from the latifundia and distributed to land less peasants. He also raised the 
wages of the Chilean worker.79 In addition, Allende attempted to build on his SNS healthcare system in 
order to make healthcare available for all Chilean citizens regardless of their social class. This was 
accomplished by a “health train” which traveled across the nation and succeeded in providing 
healthcare for 30,000 Chileans.80 In keeping with this innovation, Allende sought to make a half-liter of 
milk daily available to children under 16 through the school system. As a result 48 million liters of milk 
were distributed to children in 1970.81  
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Continuing to provide for the destitute, Allende sponsored a home construction program 
whereby 80,000 homes were constructed for needy families.82 Allende sought to align the aspirations of 
the government with those of the working class by signing an agreement with the Centralized Union of 
Workers, or the Central Unica de Trabajadores or the CUT on December 17, 1970.83 This allowed the 
workers to have an active role with the government in the nationalization process. This agreement 
sparked many controversies which will be discussed later. Allende also acquired many of the banks in 
Chile by purchasing massive amounts of bank bonds on the market.84 
In addition to providing services to the youth and underprivileged classes in Chile, Allende also 
aspired to improve Chile’s computer science prowess by raising the Chilean people to the same level as 
the United States and England. Early in Allende’s presidency, he ordered the construction of a cybernetic 
infrastructure known in English as “Cybersyn” and in Spanish as “Synco” which enabled the government 
“to grasp the status of production quickly and respond to economic crises in real time.”85  
This project would be executed in three phases: the first phase entitled “Cybernet” would 
expand the existing telex network whereby all nationalized companies along Chile’s three thousand mile 
long territory would be connected to the a central government computer in Santiago.86  The second 
phase entitled “Cyberstride” would involve the implementation of processors capable of processing and 
monitoring the information, and the third phase entitled Chilean Economy or “CHECO” involved the 
creation of software that could actually simulate economic trends in order to predict future trends in 
the Chilean market.87 As daunting as this appears, the first two phases of this project were accomplished 
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by 1973. This prompted, Stafford Beer, a British cybernetician and head of the project to declare, “[The] 
Cyberstride suite really works ... The whole thing was impossible and we did it.”88  
The ambition of this plan can only truly be appreciated after seeing the context of Chile in 
computer science before the Allende administration. In 1968 Datamation, a computer science journal, 
noted in an issue that Chile possessed only 50 computers in its territory thereby being dwarfed by the 
number of computers in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela.89 After being elected president, 
Allende sought to place his country on the cutting edge of technological innovation by creating a 
sophisticated computer network whereby the output of all companies could be monitored by the 
government. There would be public backlash for this; however this will be discussed later.  
The first year of Allende’s administration saw significant improvement over the Chilean 
economy and the advancement of the Chilean people. For example, national salary rose from 51 percent 
to 59 percent in 1970, industrial production was up by 12 percent and unemployment went down from 
12 percent to an all-time low of 3.8 percent.90 Overall production in Chile also rose by 11.6 percent and 
the real wage earnings of Chilean factory workers went up by 30 percent.91 
In keeping his Chilean Way to Socialism, Allende sought to make Chile independent from foreign 
economic interests. In doing this, Allende sought to nationalize the copper mines in Chile from the 
American Anaconda and Kennecott Companies92 and declare a moratorium on the majority of Chilean 
debts to foreign powers.93Whether Allende was conscious of this or not, this action gave the United 
States and the Nixon administration the ability to manipulate his country in numerous ways. Shortly 
after this declaration, the Nixon administration, in concert with the CIA, declared an economic blockade 
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on Chile which had repercussions leading directly to the successful coup against Allende in 1973.94 It 
should be noted that that other countries were able to compensate Chile for the reduction in U.S. loans.  
The expropriation of American interests in Chile, which prompted the blockade, was an 
economic error for the Allende administration. This is due to the fact that the ordinary 40 percent of 
Chile’s imports which come from the United States was now reduced to 20 percent due to the 
blockade.95 The Chilean people were also technologically dependent on the United States due to the fact 
that as Goldberg explains “the Chilean transportation sector [a] large percentage of all buses and trucks 
are General Motors or Ford models.”96 The expropriation of American interests resulted in Allende 
alienating the nation responsible for its development which caused a blockade that brought Chilean 
development to a halt. 
There was one exception to the blockade United States’ creditand that pertained to the Chilean 
military. The total blockade of Chile might force the military to turn to other markets such as the Soviet 
Union, for funds and hardware, which could be potentially hostile to the United States. This U.S. fear 
was justified by the fact that General Carlos Prats did in fact travel to Moscow in May 1973 to negotiate 
military sales.97 Nevertheless, the Chilean military continued to receive funds, arms, and services from 
the U.S. government.  
Allende attempted to rectify this situation by turning to the Soviet Union for economic and 
industrial aid. Allende believed that the Soviet Union would help due to the fact that it widely advocated 
that Latin American nations reduce their ties to the United States.98 Allende also noticed the $4.14 
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billion in assistance that the Soviet Union gave to Castro’s Cuba from 1967-1972.99 However, when he 
approached the USSR was to give qualified assistance to Chile, at best.  
Part of the problem was that the Soviet Union was technologically incompatible with Chile to 
provide the proper funds and materials. Economists Nogee and Sloan emphasize this in their article 
entitled “Allende's Chile and the Soviet Union: A Policy Lesson for Latin American Nations Seeking 
Autonomy.” They pointing out that the Chilean government paid $5.5 million in cash for a singular 
Boeing 727 aircraft instead of using Soviet credits for the purchase of Soviet manufactured Ilyushins due 
to the fact that Chilean pilots and mechanics would have to be retrained to operate them.100 Therefore, 
industrial equipment for Chile must be done with American-made hardware, which the Soviet Union did 
not have.  
In addition to being technologically unable to assist Chile, the Soviet Union was also 
economically incapable of assisting Chile. While it is true that the Soviet Union had funded billions of 
dollars to assist Cuba, Chile was not Cuba. Allende was not Castro. Moscow’s assistance to Havana was 
grandfathered into the Soviet economy from a commitment between Khrushchev in Castro in the name 
of “proletariat internationalism.”101 To reverse that position as Nogee and Sloan point out, “might 
undermine one of the most sacrosanct of communist principles, the irreversibility of socialist 
construction.”102 In other words, the obligation the Soviet Union had with Cuba was a carry-over from an 
older era in Soviet policy which they could not reverse. Whereas, with Chile the USSR had the 
opportunity to regulate the amount of they could give. It should be noted that while Nogee and Sloan 
do not indicate this, it could be possible that the Soviet Union was reluctant to give money to Allende on 
the ground that his Popular Unity may lose power in the Chilean government. This would heighten the 
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risk of the Soviet Union not seeing a return on their loan due to the fact that a party with an anti-Soviet 
policy might fill the vacuum and the loans would not be paid.  
It is also necessary to note that the Soviet Union could not afford “another Cuba,” let alone a 
“Chile;” especially taking into account the three thousand miles in Chile’s landscape and millions of 
citizens. The Soviet Union was already too economically committed in maintaining the status quo. This is 
not to say, however, that the Soviet Union did not assist Allende economically. The Soviet Union 
granted$183 million directly, with an additional $115 million from the Eastern bloc countries, and $65 
million from China.103  
The Soviet Union punctuated this assistance by articulating several times that Chile was not 
ready for a transition into a Marxist state. As Viktor Volsky indicated in an edition of Latinskia Amerika 
“the road to socialism on the continent of [Latin America] lies basically through a people's democratic 
revolution, those who have claimed that Latin America is now ready for a full transition to socialism are 
condemned as radicals, guilty of what Lenin called ‘left-wing infantilism.’"104 Pravda also stated that the 
Soviet Union endorsed the Popular Unity to maintain a mixed economic structure of both private and 
public property “for a long time to come.”105Allende, due to his differences in Marxist-Leninist theory, 
coupled with an overestimation of possible Soviet aid, was frustrated in his attempts for larger Soviet 
aid.  
While Allende was frustrated in not getting larger financial support from the Soviet Union, he 
was able to successfully barter however $800 million at the Paris Club which would be used to pay off 
foreign debts to other countries.106 Allende’s loan from the Paris Club to pay another set of loans is 
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analogous to using a credit card to paying off another credit card. This demonstrates a critical point in 
the economics of Allende’s government; that he accumulated more debt to pay off earlier debts.  
While Allende’s attempts for international aid were being frustrated, issues continued to plague 
him domestically. Mass assemblies were staged against the Chilean government such as the “walkouts” 
whereby truck owners and taxi drivers took to the streets in order to protest their inability to maintain 
their vehicles, namely the scarcity of tires.107 Eventually, the Confederation of Truck Owner-Operators 
waged a strike in October 1972 that was aided by the CIA.108 Again the truckers would strike again in July 
1973.109 One of the famous acts of protest against the Allende administration was the March of Empty 
Pots which occurred in December 1971 whereby middle and upper class women marched through 
Santiago chanting slogans such as “Listen to us Allende,” “Chilean Women ---- Save Chile from 
Socialism,” and “There is no meat; there is nothing.”110 This was caused by the fact that Chile’s 
agricultural system went from exporting agricultural goods in 1969 to having to import $280 million in 
foodstuffs in the early 1970s.111 
One success, however, was the “Cybersyn” project which Allende created to technologically 
advance the Chilean computer network. The press and the Chilean people lambasted it, however, as 
being an element of totalitarian control. A Chilean centrist publication Ercilla denounced the project as 
being “El hermano mayor” or “Big Brother” referencing the George Orwell book 1984 and the right wing 
magazine Que Pasa denounced the project under the slogan “Nos controlan por computacion” or “They 
control us through computer science.”112 In response to his healthcare innovation, many doctors 
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boycotted the SNS system choosing to remain in private practice in order to tend to wealthier 
patients.113 
Almost immediately after Allende’s election, the copper miners at Chuquicamata went on strike 
and petitioned Allende for a wage increase of 70 percent, the president berated them however for being 
a “labor aristocracy.”114 The strike cost Chile $36 million in 1970 and $12 million in 1971.115 Many of 
these strikes were considered to be illegal by Chilean law. For a strike to be considered legal in Chile, it 
must be due to the failure of collective bargaining. By this reckoning, striking for any other reason such 
as protesting the government for violation of civil rights, protesting factory owners for arbitrary use of 
power, or protesting for political issues, was deemed illegal.116 
 Allende attempted to rectify this by bringing the military into the negotiations. To end the 1972 
trucker’s strike Allende called General Prats to join the cabinet. Allende’s decision was in error, 
according to historian Paul Sigmund, who said that, “accelerated the politicization of the military and 
undermined the position of those like Prats who favored the maintenance and constitutionalism of 
civilian rule.”117 Sigmund’s argument is well taken because not only did Allende’s action bring the 
military into a civilian affairs, it also was a largely right wing entity, supporting a radical left wing cause. 
This had the potential to cause massive conflict within the ranks of the Chilean military. 
One political issue that clearly points out the flaw in Allende’s “Chilean Way to Socialism” was 
the issue of the democratic process. In being elected president of Chile, Allende took control of the 
executive branch of the Chilean government. However, the judicial and the legislative branches 
remained in control of the opposition parties. For example, of the justices of the Supreme Court in Chile, 
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only one was loyal to Allende, and he was scheduled to retire.118 The legislative branch in Chile was 
openly hostile to Allende’s agenda and tried to counter him at every possible chance, resulting in mutual 
antagonism. A prime example of this was in July 1971 the Christian Democratic majority in Congress 
accused the Allende administration of using loopholes in the Constitution to expropriate Chilean 
industries and proposed an amendment to the constitution whereby Congress would have to ratify all 
further expropriations.119 Allende rejected this amendment on the basis that it limited his power as chief 
executive.  
Another example that further demonstrates the clash of political ideologies was the fact that 
both the Christian Democratic Party and the National Party formed a political alliance with various trade 
unions including truck drivers, pharmacists, and general shop owners. Together they staged a massive 
strike against the Allende administration and the Popular Union which occurred in October 1972 and 
again in September 1973.120 This strike called for Allende to be removed from office. As chaos threated 
on the national political scale, schisms began to form within Allende’s own Popular Unity such as 
between the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the CUT, and the MIR, and the VOP, and the MAPU.121  
These schisms were based on both political strategy and Marxist theory. For the VOP and the 
MIR, the peaceful Chilean way could not possibly work. Their interpretation of Marxism was that only 
through a violent uprising of the working class can a bourgeois society be transformed. This is evidenced 
by the fact that the MIR began to seize land illegally and even without the permission of the Popular 
Unity. Even worse the VOP managed to assassinate President Frei’s former interior minister Edmundo 
Perez Zujovic in June 1971.122 These schisms impeded Allende from fully executing his duties and powers 
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as president and instead reduced him to what could be described as a mediator or a committee 
chairman. Not only were massive schisms forming between the Popular Unity and the National and 
Christian Democratic Parties, schisms were also forming within the UP coalition itself, leading to lack of 
political cohesion and anarchy.  
Disunion was also occurring at the societal level. Instead of uniting all social classes into one 
cohesive society, as per Marxist doctrine, Allende’s Chilean Way was fracturing classes and pitting them 
against each other and the government. This occurred immediately after Allende was elected with the 
mass exodus of Chile’s upper class. They feared that what would follow would be a Castro-like 
restructuring of power in Chile.123 Later some of these people returned after realizing the opposition 
was preventing the concentration of Allende’s power. The expropriation of the Chilean mines from the 
United States damaged the incomes of the upper class people in Chile due to their dependence on the 
revenue making them wholly dependent on foreign capitalist. The absorption of the banks by the 
Allende administration further damaged the Chilean upper class in that it inhibited them from 
maintaining control of their capital holdings.124The Chilean upper class was becoming more and more 
hostile to the Allende administration and his Popular Unity coalition.  
It does not necessarily follow that the people in opposition immediately turned to the coup as 
the first option to remove Allende from power. There was faith that both Allende and the Popular Unity 
could be removed from power via the democratic process. For the April 1973 congressional election the 
Christian Democratic Party and the National Party formed a coalition known in Spanish as the CODE, or 
Democratic Coalition. The purpose of the CODE was to elect enough members into Congress to pass a 
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resolution declaring the unconstitutionality of Allende’s administration and force him to resign.125 
Allende’s and the Popular Unity’s policies were unpopular, and as a result received only 44 percent of 
the vote while the CODE received 55 percent of the vote. However, this was not enough to impeach the 
president.126 This election demonstrated the failure of the democratic process to remove Allende from 
power, from this moment on a coup was implemented. 
The coup of September 1973 was a long time coming relying on the slow unification of the 
military against the Allende administration. A demonstration of this was El Tanquetazo  or “Tank Putsch” 
which occurred in June 1973 whereby as the name implies, a faction of the military, associated with the 
ultra-right wing grassroots organization Patria y Libertad/Fatherland and Liberty started an armed 
rebellion against the Allende administration with tanks.127 Upon approaching La Moneda, the 
presidential palace, the drivers of the tanks ordered the surrender of Allende and his palace guards. The 
latter replied with a statement saying, “The guard never surrenders, damn it! (La guardia no se rinde  
nunca, mierda).”128 The tanks called for the rest of the military to join with them against the Allende 
administration, but instead of joining them, the Commander in Chief, General Carlos Prats persuaded 
them to surrender. It should be noted that the organization responsible for this act of rebellion, 
Fatherland and Liberty was directly sponsored by CIA money which was still being funded covertly. 
Therefore, any possible statement that the U.S. government knew nothing about the coup against 
Allende is open for debate. Other acts of terrorism continued to plague Chile during this time such as 
the bombing of electrical pylons which caused a blackout in Santiago during a speech given by 
Allende.129 
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 Dissention in the ranks of government began to wage during this time, after el Tanquetazo, as 
disagreements waged between some military officers who believed that the military should uphold the 
constitution and support the government and other military officers who believed that the government 
should forcibly overthrow the Allende government and reconstruct it in their own image. Being 
incapable of resolving these issues, Carlos Prats then resigned.130 Prats’ successor, General Augusto 
Pinochet was named the Commander in Chief of the Army in August soon he led, the military coup, even 
though he is reported to have initially refused to support it.131  
This fact may play into one of the greatest ironies of the coup: President Allende actually 
thought Pinochet was loyal to the Chilean government. Allende’s aide David Garrido, remembering the 
day of the coup said, “The President tried to call the commanders and chief, but he couldn’t find 
Pinochet anywhere. [He] couldn’t get him on the phone. He was unobtainable. So [Allende] said, ‘Poor 
Pinochet, what’s happened to him? What’s happened to poor Pinochet? Thinking he was loyal.”132 
Through all of this, the military tried to find a peaceful solution to the coup without violence. 
This is evidenced by a statement U.S. Ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis made in his memoir in which 
he declared that the military general “went to see Allende again and again, mostly through their 
commanders-in-chiefs… and asked the President to reconsider his policies…they squirmed, temporized, 
and looked for ways out and it was a reluctant, uncertain inconclusive process…it was late –only days 
before the coup—when the armed forces moved collectively beyond the point of no return.”133  
Kyle Steenland points out the anatomy of the coup in his article stating that the Army’s 
commitment to the coup was the final piece to the puzzle in the movement against the Allende 
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administration because the Navy and the Air Force had been waiting to wage a coup for quite some 
time.134  
 Steenland also points out the plausibility of the United States military and CIA involvement in 
the coup. Steenland strengthens this point by citing another military operation codenamed Mission 
Airstream in which U.S. military aircraft were stationed in Mendoza, Argentina. As part of this mission 
these American aircrafts flew over Chile from September 7 to September 13. Even though the Nixon 
administration blatantly denies the existence of the mission, the Chilean Agencia Arauco, confirms the 
existence of the mission and the names of the pilots.135 Steenland also draws on documentation that 
places 15 U.S. Special Forces soldiers 30 kilometers away from Santiago, Chile on the day of the coup.136 
Steenland further indicates that a CIA operative was involved in the assassination of Allende’s naval aide 
Commodore Arturo Araya Peters.137 
 In his book, El Ultimo Dia de Salvador Allende, Oscar Soto emphatically denies U.S. involvement 
in the planning of the coup but brings up the issue of possible U.S. military intervention. One of the main 
points in the second part of Soto’s book is that although the United States had nothing to do with the 
coup itself, it is plausible that the U.S. military was serving as “back up” for the military and was willing 
to intervene in the coup militarily should the Chilean military fail in its attempt to remove Allende from 
office.  
 The basis for Soto’s argument can be found on Operation: Unitas, an international cooperative 
involving U.S. and Chilean naval vessels conducting maneuvers outside of Valparaiso: the first city to be 
taken in the coup. Soto also states that the Chilean Navy was the first of the military branches to revolt 
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against the central government by taking Valparaiso and Vina del Mar on the morning of the coup.138 
Soto then draws his conclusion that Operation: Unitas was a contingency plan for removing Allende 
from power by saying,  
“It is obvious although the American diplomats may deny it considering their belligerent position 
[against the Allende administration]…[that the U.S. military] would be willing to intervene if the 
coup failed, [this was] already programmed. []”139 
 This point is very well taken considering other plans the U.S. government had implemented for 
regime change in Latin America such as the various operations to remove the Castro brothers from 
power in Cuba. The idea that the country’s people would act first and then the U.S. military would 
intervene if necessary is a cornerstone to these plans.  
 The points brought up by Soto and Steenland prove that the U.S. had knowledge if not 
participated in the plan of the coup but it is up for discussion as to how extensive the U.S.’s role was. As 
for the intention of the Chilean military pertaining to the life of Salvador Allende, Robinson Rojas 
Sanford draws on documentation that indicated the military wanted Allende dead, whether he killed 
himself or the military did it for him.  
 In his book The Murder of Allende and the End of the Chilean Way to Socialism, Rojas Sanford 
outlines several points to show that the military had no intention of keeping Allende alive and that his 
death would be staged as a suicide whether Allende did it himself or not. In constructing his argument, 
Rojas Sanford references a document which was allegedly constructed between the Chilean military and 
the U.S. Army intelligence group outlining two possibilities for Allende’s fate during the coup. This 
document is connected with other literature pertaining to Alpha Phase One, the first part of the coup 
whereby Allende would be deposed.  
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 The first probability was that Allende would be “intimidated by the deployment of armored cars 
and infantry and under the threat of aerial bombardment would commit suicide before the battle 
begins.” The second probability states that Allende would “realiz[e] his defenselessness and knowing 
perfectly well that the civilians are incapable of defending themselves…will surrender. This may happen 
before or after an aerial bombardment.”140  
In the event of the first probability happening, the military would then continue with what was 
codenamed “Phase Two” which involved “the disaccreditation [sic] of the suicide’s character, focusing 
on an image of a drunkard, libertine, and hedonist.”141 In the event of the second probability happening, 
Allende would be isolated from both civilian and military authorities and escorted to the 2nd Armored 
Headquarters. While there Allende would be “subject[ed] to humiliation (disrobed, in ridiculous poses… 
will be forced to commit humiliating acts which will be openly photographed) based on information we 
have about him. Their traumatic attempt should result in suicide.”142 The logic behind this tactic is 
sound, it could be said that the military favored Allende’s death over his exile due to the experience of 
Argentina’s military in its attempts to oust its leader Juan Domingo Peron. While the military had 
successfully removed Peron from Argentina, he still maintained control of the country through the 
unions and grassroots organizations such as the People’s Revolutionary Army. Killing Allende would 
lower the probability of this civil unrest.  
Rojas Sanford’s argument and the documentation he cites clash with a statement made by 
Pinochet on the day of the coup which was made in a radio communication which was intercepted by a 
radio hobbyist. To a statement by General Carvajal stating that the military should take Allende and his 
followers in La Moneda prisoner, Pinochet replied yelling, “My opinion is that those gentlemen take a 
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plane anywhere they want to go, and that includes by the path that they’re firing through from bellow. 
La opinión mía es que estos caballeros se toman y se mandan por avión a cualquier parte, e incluso por el 
camino los van tirando abajo.”143  
 The notion of Allende being offered safe passage out of the country is confirmed in Soto’s 
account which occurred during the coup. Soto recalls being approached by Commandante Roberto 
Sanchez and being told, “Doctor, I have come to offer the president a plane so that he can leave the 
country. He has refused it. I am going to see if there is a loyal unit. (Doctor, he venido a ofrecerle un 
avión al presidente para que salga del país. Lo ha rechazado. Voy a ver si hay una unidad leal.)”144 
 But as Soto repeatedly states in his account, Allende had no intention of leaving. This is 
evidenced in a statement Soto recalls Allende giving to the people inside La Moneda during the siege 
which is shown in the excerpt below:  
Comrades, the military coup is underway…We do not have any armed forces that are with us…I 
have taken a lot of time for my decision: I will not surrender, nor will I leave the country, nor will 
I leave La Moneda. I will fight to the end. I thank you all for the loyalty and the collaboration that 
you have given me but I tell you that there mustn’t be meaningless victims. Most of you have 
wives and small children. Your duty is with them and the people of Chile. This is not the final 
battle…I will fight because I have a mandate from the workers and the people that like 
everything else in my life, I will faithfully fulfill. See Appendix I145 
 
 Soto then recalls the final moments of Allende’s life when, after several hours of firing and 
withstanding air strikes, Soto reported to Allende that military soldiers have taken the first floor of La 
Moneda to which and were ordering Allende to put down his weapons and surrender.146 Upon hearing 
this, Soto recalls Allende walking into the Salon of Independence with his AK-47. Soto recalls being on 
his way down the stairway to turn himself in when he heard two shots. Soto then recalls running back to 
the Salon of Independence and seeing that Allende “had fired his weapon on himself [se ha disparado su 
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metralla] ” and that his weapon was “still between his legs [que todavia esta entre sus piernas]” with his 
“skull destroyed [con su craneo destrozado].”147  
 Soto’s account discredits any possible theory that the Allende’s death was an assassination 
although several people like Rojas Sanford attempt to call it an assassination by pointing out various 
flaws in the original autopsy report. Rojas Sanford’s attempt at debunking the “suicide” thesis is aimed 
at the original autopsy report and pointing out its errors. Rojas Sanford also states that Allende’s body 
was not taken to the morgue after it was recovered by the military. This was because according to a 
telephone conversation between General Bonilla and Air Force General Nicanor Diaz Estrada the 
morgue was “a nest of extremists and they may try to steal the body.”148 Rojas Sanford also adds that 
the body was secretly transported to the Military Hospital.  
 The first error Rojas Sanford points out is that the coroner stated that the time of death which 
was determined at 6:10 p.m. occurred six hours before the autopsy was undertaken. Simple arithmetic 
concludes that Allende had passed away at 12:10 p.m. at a time when the siege was still happening and 
two hours before Allende actually died.149 
  Another element of Allende’s death that Rojas Sanford points out is the accepted account of his 
suicide is problematic to physically attempt. The accepted account of Allende’s death is that he held his 
AK-47 between his legs and pressed the barrel of the rifle under his chin and pulled the trigger. Rojas 
Sanford rejects this account by virtue of the fact that the physical maneuvering necessary to accomplish 
such a stance with a rifle like an AK-47 because it is “an ‘uncomfortable’ position of ‘unstable 
equilibrium ‘frontward.’”150 Therefore Allende would have to fire the weapon while standing on his toes 
causing forward momentum to seize his corpse after he died, instead of backwards like he was allegedly 
found.  
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 Two of the final elements of the autopsy Rojas Sanford disputes are the alleged amount of 
alcohol in Allende’s bloodstream and the issue of powder burns on Allende’s hands. Rojas Sanford 
automatically states that the “analysis of the skin on the hands and chin show the presence of 
gunpowder, caused by the use of a firearm”151 passage is invalid due to the fact that Allende was firing 
the same AK-47 he used to kill himself in the siege against the military. Rojas Sanford then rejects the 
statement made by the coroner that reads “Allende’s body showed a 90% level of alcohol poisoning” 
because eye witnesses, including Soto, state that Allende was not drinking the day of the attack. Rojas 
Sanford then concludes that this statement was made in order to support the “drunken President” 
theory that the military constructed and disseminated to the public.  
 Steenland complements Rojas Sanford’s “assassination thesis” by stating, like Rojas Sanford 
states, that Allende was killed by a Chilean military officer known as Capitan Garrido and that Allende 
was killed by three bullets: one of which struck him in the stomach while a fellow soldier shot Allende in 
the abdomen.152 This obviously violently clashes with Soto’s account stating that Allende went into a 
secluded room in La Moneda and shot himself. Steenland tries to rectify this discrepancy by 
hypothesizing that witnesses to the death of Allende were threatened by the military to keep the truth 
of his death, secret.153 The major flaw in this hypothesis is that in the almost forty years since this event, 
none of the witnesses have reversed themselves on the account of Allende’s death.  
 Allende’s death happened nearly forty years ago, the popular rejection of Pinochet’s rule was 
approximately twenty years ago. Any possible threat to exposing the truth of Allende’s fate has long 
since expired and every witness has continued to maintain that Allende committed suicide after telling 
his compatriots to surrender. If there were a cover up, it is very probable that the truth would come out 
after the death of Pinochet in 2006, but nothing of the sort has occurred.  
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 The hypotheses of this event must therefore be weighed by the credentials of the people who 
pose them. Soto was Allende’s personal physician, a cardiologist by trade, who was physically inside of 
La Moneda during the assault. Although the publication of his book is roughly thirty years after this 
event and the validity of his memory can be called into question, Soto’s narrative is published after the 
junta’s collapse, at a time when possible backlash for revealing a cover up would be minimal at best. 
Conversely, Rojas Sanford was a leftist journalist by trade who was in Chile during the time of the coup 
but however was not at La Moneda on the day of the coup. Rojas Sanford builds his argument using 
telephone transcripts between military officers as well as documents written by the military during the 
planning phase of the military coup.  
 Rojas Sanford’s ethos gives the “assassination thesis” more credibility than Steenland. 
Steenland’s ethos is less reputable due to the fact that he was a tenured professor in American Studies 
at State University at New York in Buffalo who based his data on documents from leftist Chilean 
organizations, such as the publication for the MAPU. These leftist organizations would naturally have a 
tainted opinion on the military and the alleged views that the U.S. was involved in the coup. To further 
damage Steenland’s ethos, his citations involving the coup are fragmented and in various places missing; 
which lends his argument more towards speculation than actual historical theorizing. Nevertheless, his 
statement does correspond with Rojas Sanford’s arguments which are firmly grounded on reputable 
sources. Their argument clashes with the account of Soto who was an eye witness to the event. 
 This debate on the actual circumstances of Allende’s death has waged over the years. In 2011, 
Allende’s body was exhumed in order to empirically confirm the cause of Allende’s death, whether 
murder or suicide. After an examination, it was confirmed by Spanish forensics expert Francisco 
Etxeberria that “We have absolutely no doubt [that Allende committed suicide.]”154 Etxeberria indicates 
                                                          




that Allende’s body was assailed by two bullets instead three like Rojas Sanford and Steenland claim, 
and that these bullets were fired at such an angle that only Allende could have fired them.155 Therefore 
Soto’s argument can finally be deemed the more valid interpretation to this event while the 
“assassination thesis” does pose some legitimate questions such as the discrepancies in Allende’s 
original autopsy.  
After the death of Allende, the military stepped in, dissolved the Chilean Congress and began to 
wage terror against suspected leftists who supported the Allende administration. Various torture 
techniques were used by the military in order to obtain information from the abducted prisoners 
including “Electric current applied to neck, ear, chest, sexual organs. Blows against the ear until the 
eardrum bursts. Hoses introduced into the mouth with water forced through them. Tearing out 
fingemails. Cigarettes used to burn the inner ear. Beatings with rubber clubs. Blows with nails against 
the teeth. Introduction of needles in the body. Forcing prisoners to run with shoes full of broken 
glass.”156 Steenland points out that these techniques came from both American and Brazilian sources.157 
This further indicates that the United States may have played a role in the execution of Allende due to 
the fact that it played a major role in the construction of the junta and the counterrevolution against the  
“Chilean way to socialism.”  
The death of Salvador Allende marks the lethal end to a political experiment where a political 
coalition believed a utopian socialist society could be obtained through the democratic process without 
a violent uprising of the oppressed lower classes. The failure of this experiment can be marked by both 
local and international opponents who repeatedly attempted to block Allende from becoming president 
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and continued to antagonize Allende while he was president. However the crux of the failure of the 
Chilean Way to Socialism was the fact that its opposition was more unified and organized than Allende’s 
supporters. This can be seen through a combination of the steady decline of the union between the 
leftist parties who made up the Popular Unity and the steady alignment of the right wing Chilean 
parties, and the military with financial aid from the United States at the very least.  
Allende’s unique Marxist theory was an experiment that doomed to failure as evidenced by the 
United States’ efforts to influence Chilean elections, to right wing organizations in Chile threatening 
coups if Allende won, and to the ultimate demise of Allende on September 11, 1973. Getting the proper 
coordination and strength to effectively destroy him and his coalition was only a matter of time.  After 
twelve years attempting to be president and another three years on the job, the “Chilean Way to 
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From Soto, 83-84 
 
Compañeras, y compañeros: el golpe militar esta en marcha… No tenemos fuerzas militares organizadas que estén 
con nosotros… yo he tomado hace mucho tiempo mi decisión: no renunciare ni me iré del país, ni abandonare La 
Moneda. Luchare hasta el final. Les agradezco a todos la lealtad y colaboración que siempre me han presentado; 
pero quiero decirles que no deben haber victimas inútiles. La mayoría de ustedes son jóvenes, tienen mujer e hijos 
pequeños. Tienen un deber con ellos y con el pueblo de Chile. No es este el último combate… Yo combatiré, porque 
tengo un mandato de los trabajadores y el pueblo, que, como a través de toda mi vida, cumpliré con lealtad. 
